Abstract. Secure multiparty computation allows a group of distrusting parties to jointly compute a (possibly randomized) function of their inputs. However, it is often the case that the parties executing a computation try to solve a search problem, where one input may have a multitude of correct answers-such as when the parties compute a shortest path in a graph or find a solution of a set of linear equations.
Introduction
Secure multiparty computation addresses a setting where several distrusting parties want to jointly compute a function f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) of their private inputs x 1 , . . . , x n while maintaining the privacy of their inputs. One of the most fundamental, and by now well known, achievements in cryptography (initiated by [3, 9, 15, 21] , and continued by a long line of research) shows that, for any feasible function f , there exist secure multiparty protocols for f in a variety of settings.
However, in many cases, what the parties wish to compute is not a function with just a single possible output for each input, and not even a randomized function with a well-defined output distribution. Rather, in many cases the parties are solving a problem where several correct answers (or solutions) may exist for a single joint input. For example, the parties may jointly hold a graph and wish to compute a shortest path between two of its vertices or to find a minimal vertex cover in it. 1 Such problems are called search problems.
When one tries to apply the known results of secure multiparty computation to search problems, one has first to decide upon a polynomial-time computable function that solves the search problem. That is, one should present a specific algorithm that assigns a single output, or a well-defined distribution on the output space, to every possible input.
An approach often taken by designers of secure multiparty protocols for such applications is to arbitrarily choose one of the existing algorithms/heuristics for the search problem and implement a secure protocol for it. This indeed amounts to choosing an arbitrary (possibly randomized) function that provides a solution and implementing it securely. The privacy implications of such choices have not been analyzed. It is usually easy to come up with "bad" algorithms that encode in their output choices crucial information about one or more of their inputs, and it may be that algorithms accidentally leak such information even if not maliciously designed. It is clear that if the computed function leaks information on the parties' private inputs, any protocol realizing it, no matter how secure, will also leak this information. Thus, some privacy requirements should be imposed on the chosen input-output functionality.
To illustrate the necessity of a rigid discussion of secure computation of search problems, consider the following setting. A server holds a database with valuable information, and a client makes queries to this database such that there may be many different answers to a single query. The server is interested in choosing the answers to the client's queries in a way that reveals the "least information possible about the database."
The answering strategy the server chooses influences the revealed information. For example, consider a case where the client queries for the name of a person whose details are in the database and satisfy some condition. If the server answers such queries with the details of the appropriate person whose name is the lexicographically first in the database, then it reveals the fact that every person prior to that person in the lexicographic order does not satisfy the given condition.
This Work
In this paper we study some of the privacy implications of how the output is chosen for search problems, we propose two privacy requirements and provide constructions achieving them for several problems. Our work generalizes the approach taken in [1] , where the problem of private search was introduced in the context of approximation algorithms. Finally, we give examples for problems that admit private search algorithms of certain kinds and do not admit other.
Our work is closest in spirit to that of Beimel et al. [1] . They have put forward what seems to be a minimal requirement of privacy. 2 Informally:
Private Search: If two instances x, y have an identical set of possible solutions, their outputs should not be distinguished.
That is, in order for an algorithm to be private, on any input instance its output must only depend on the solution set for that input-not on the specific input. In the context of private approximations of functions [11] (and, similarly, for those instances of search problems for which a unique solution exists), this turns out to be a significant privacy guarantee-it implies that the approximation algorithm does not leak any information beyond the exact f (x). However, in the context of search problems the implication is potentially much weaker-no information beyond the entire solution set of x is leaked. Arguably, for many applications requiring privacy, leaking information up to the entire solution set does not provide a sufficient privacy guarantee. We note that this weak definition was reasonable in the context of [1] because they provide mostly negative results (so a weaker definition corresponds to stronger infeasibility results).
Note that even with the minimal definition of privacy of [1] , the notion of private search has so far proved to be very problematic. Search versions of many NP-complete problems do not admit even much weakened notions of private approximation algorithms, and private search is infeasible even for some problems that do admit (nonprivate) polynomial time search algorithms [1, 2] .
We are thus faced with a double challenge: first, strengthen the privacy definition, imposing further requirements on the function in order to provide reasonable privacy guarantees. Second, provide protocols implementing the stronger definitions for as wide as possible a class of search problems. This is the goal we tackle in this work.
Which further requirements should be imposed on the outcome of private search algorithms? While the answer to this question may be application dependent, we identify two (incomparable) requirements and study which problems admit those requirements and which techniques can be used to achieve them.
Before elaborating on this, let us start with two naïve proposals-to demonstrate essential privacy considerations arising for search problems and to facilitate our actual proposed definitions and algorithms. In the following informal discussion, we call two instances of a search problem equivalent if they have the same sets of solutions.
Deterministic vs. Randomized Private Algorithms
Consider first requiring any private algorithm A to be deterministic. As such, for each input, it consistently selects one of the solutions, and hence subsequent applications of the algorithm on the same (or equivalent) inputs do not reveal further information. A possible choice is to output the lexicographically first solution. This choice is computationally feasible for several polynomially solvable search problems such as the problem of finding a solution for a linear system, and stable marriage (using the stable marriage with restrictions algorithm [10] ). 3 Deterministic private search algorithms, however, leak definite information, which (depending on the application) may turn out to be crucial. Consider, for example, a database of computer science papers and their authors that on a query-a paper's titlereturns one of the paper's authors' names. Whenever the deterministic private search algorithm answers differently on two instances-papers x and y-this serves as a definite indication that the author lists for x and y are not identical, even if the author lists are similar. If, furthermore, the deterministic private search algorithm returns the lexicographically first solution, it rules out all solutions that are ordered below it. For example, the answer to the query instance "How Should We Solve Search Problems Privately?" reveals that none of its authors' names starts with an "A".
Next, consider a randomized algorithm A which on input x selects an answer from the set of solutions according to a specific distribution (this distribution does not depend on the specific instance but may depend on the solution set). A natural choice here is to pick a solution uniformly at random. Randomized private algorithms may be advantageous to deterministic private algorithms, since the information they leak is potentially "blurred." In our database example, if papers x, y have similar author lists, then the resulting output distributions would be close. On the other hand, when applied repeatedly on the same instance, there is a potential for an increased leakage (this clearly is the case with our database example, since repeated querying yields a learning of all the authors of a paper in a coupon collecting manner). Another example, where the solution space is exponential and can be completely learned using a polynomial number of repeated evaluations of a randomized private search algorithm, is the problem of finding a solution for a linear system of equations; the number of revealed solutions grows roughly exponentially in the number of invocations, until the entire solution space is revealed.
We note that the benefits and disadvantages of deterministic and randomized algorithms are generally incomparable. Moreover, there exist problems for which an algorithm outputting uniformly selected solutions exists, but no deterministic private algorithm exists (under standard assumptions), and vice versa (see Sect. 5).
Framework: Seeded Algorithms
In the following, we restrict our attention to what we call seeded algorithms. The idea of seeded algorithms is not new-these are deterministic algorithms that get as input a "random" seed s and an instance x. If the seed s is selected at random the first time the seeded algorithm is invoked, subsequent invocations on the same input may be answered consistently. A seeded algorithm allows selecting a random solution for each instance (separately), while preventing abuse of repeated queries. Arguably, seeded algorithms are less desirable than algorithms that do not need to maintain any state information. 4 However, we note that the state information of seeded algorithms is rather easy to maintain, since the parties do not need to keep a log of previously answered queries, and hence their state does not grow with the number of queries. In that, the usage of seeded algorithms is similar to that of pseudorandom functions.
Our Results
To focus on the choice of a function for solving a search problem, we abstract out the implementation details of the underlying secure multiparty setting (similarly to [1, 2, 11, 17] ). Our results directly apply to a client-server setup, where the server is willing to let the client learn a solution to a specific search problem applied to its input. They similarly apply to the setup of a distributed multiparty computation where the parties share an instance x using a secret sharing scheme, as it can be reduced to a clientserver setup using secure function evaluation protocols [3, 9, 15, 21] . In the general setup of distributed multiparty computation, however, one may also consider definitions that allow revealing information to a party implied by its individual input.
Equivalence-ProtectingAlgorithms Equivalence-protecting algorithms are seeded algorithms that choose a uniformly random answer for each class of equivalent instances. Given the seed, the output is deterministic and respects equivalence of instances-an access to an equivalence-protecting algorithm A P for a problem P simulates an access to a random oracle for P that answers consistently on inputs with the same solutions. 5 To some extent, equivalence-protecting algorithms enjoy benefits of both the naïve privacy notions discussed above, deterministic and randomized private algorithms: (i) there is a potential for not giving "definite" information; and (ii) leakage is not accumulated with repeated queries. However, equivalence-protecting algorithms do allow distinguishing instances even when their solution sets are very close.
Recalling our database example, we note that equivalence protection may give better privacy guarantees than the examples of private search discussed in Sect. 1.1.1. The following toy "covert channel" problem is another example that demonstrates how equivalence protection can give better privacy guarantees than private search. An instance of the problem consists of a graph G = (V , E), and a solution for an instance G consists of a matching M in G and a string C (whose content is not restricted). An equivalenceprotecting algorithm should return a (pseudo) random string in C, rendering it useless for an attacker. On the other hand, a private search algorithm may put in C any function of the entire set of matchings for G, and hence the outcome string C may inadvertently turn into a channel leaking information about G. For instance, it may be that the private algorithm reveals one matching of G in M and another one in C. Of course, in real applications the covert channel may not be as visible as in this toy problem.
In Sect. 3 we reduce the problem of designing an equivalence-protecting algorithm for a search problem to that of (i) designing a deterministic algorithm for finding a 4 In secure multiparty computation, the parties should jointly generate a random seed and then work with this shared seed in subsequent executions of the algorithm. In a client-server setup, the server should generate the seed the first time it is invoked and use it in future invocations. 5 Such a random oracle can be thought of as an ideal model solution to the problem, which the equivalenceprotecting algorithm is required to emulate.
canonical representative of the equivalence class; (ii) designing a randomized private algorithm returning a uniformly chosen solution; and (iii) the existence of pseudorandom functions. We then show how to use this to construct an equivalence-protecting algorithm for what we call "monotone search problems," a wide class of functions including perfect matching in bipartite graphs and shortest path in directed graphs. We further demonstrate the power of our general construction by showing an equivalenceprotecting algorithm for solving a system of linear equations over a finite field.
Resemblance-Preserving Algorithms Our second strengthening of the requirements on a private search algorithm addresses the problem of distinguishing nonequivalent instances with similar solution sets. Similarly to equivalence-protecting algorithms, resemblance-preserving algorithms choose a random solution for each set of equivalence instances. However, here the choices of the output for nonequivalent instances are highly correlated so that pairs of instances that have close output sets are answered identically with high probability. In Sect. 4 we present a generic construction of resemblance-preserving algorithms for any search problem whose output space admits a pairwise independent family of permutations where the minimum of a permuted solution set can be computed efficiently. Examples of such search problems include finding roots or non-roots of a polynomial, solving a system of linear equations over a finite field, finding a point in a union of rectangles in a fixed dimensional space, and finding a satisfying assignment for a DNF formula. It is interesting to note that for the last problem, finding an efficient equivalence-protecting algorithm implies RP = NP.
Summary We present two definitions that try to answer the particular concerns raised in Sect. 1.1.1 above and (at least intuitively) seem suitable for different applications. We provide technical tools to achieve these definitions and identify generic classes, as well as specific examples, of search problems where our tools can be used to yield private search algorithms with the desired properties.
It is interesting to note that the definition of equivalence-protecting algorithms is more "cryptographic," whereas the definition of resemblance-preserving algorithms is more "combinatorial." Equivalence-protecting is defined via using the ideal world vs. real world paradigm, and for many problems (including all our examples), the existence of an equivalence-protecting algorithm implies computational hardness-the existence of pseudorandom functions. The definition of resemblance-preserving algorithms does not use the ideal world vs. real world paradigm, and most of our examples only make use of combinatorial tools.
The main conceptual contribution of this work is in putting forward the need to study private computation of search problems (where a non-private solution is known). We also initiate a study of which privacy requirements are tractable for specific problems. Our main technical contributions are in the tools and algorithms presented in Sect. 4 for resemblance-preserving algorithms.
Other variants of private search have been researched in previous work. A variant where privacy is preserved w.r.t. instances that share the same set of approximate solutions was presented in [2, 18] , and a variant where the approximation algorithm is allowed to leak a well-quantified amount of information was presented in [1, 17] . We note that unlike these two variants, which are relaxations of private search, the notions we examine in this work are strictly stronger than private search.
Organization
We start in Sect. 2 with definitions of search problems and the minimal privacy requirement of [1] . We define equivalence-protecting algorithms and resemblance-preserving algorithms and show the basic techniques for constructing them in Sect. 3 and in Sect. 4, respectively. We discuss the relationships between the classes of private algorithms in Sect. 5 and conclude in Sect. 6.
Definitions
We define a search problem as a function assigning to an instance x ∈ {0, 1} n a solution set P n (x). Two instances of a search problem are equivalent if they have exactly the same solution set. More formally: Definition 2.1 (Search Problems). A search problem is an ensemble P = {P n } n∈N such that
for some positive polynomial q(n).
Definition 2.2 (Instance Equivalence)
. For a search problem P, the equivalence relation ≡ P includes all pairs of instances x, y ∈ {0, 1} n such that P n (x) = P n (y).
We now recall the minimal definition of private search algorithms from [1] . All our privacy definitions will be stronger-an algorithm that satisfies one of Definitions 2.4, 2.5, 3.2, or 4.2 trivially satisfies Definition 2.3.
Definition 2.3 (Private Search Algorithms [1]).
A probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A P is a private search algorithm for P if 1. A P (x) ∈ P n (x) for all x ∈ {0, 1} n , n ∈ N (that is, the algorithm always returns a valid solution); and 2. For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D and for every positive polynomial q(·), there exists some n 0 ∈ N such that, for every x, y ∈ {0, 1} * satisfying x ≡ P y and |x| = |y| ≥ n 0 ,
.
That is, when x ≡ P y, no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm D can distinguish whether the input of A P is x or y.
Two natural special cases are of deterministic private algorithms and output-sampling algorithms:
Definition 2.5 (Output-Sampling Algorithms). Let P = {P n } n∈N be a search problem. A randomized algorithm A is called an output-sampling algorithm for P if for every x ∈ {0, 1} n , the distribution A(x, r) is computationally indistinguishable from Unif P(x) , the uniform distribution on the possible outputs on x. That is, for every family of polynomial-size circuits with oracle access {C n } n∈N , every polynomial p(·), and all sufficiently large n's,
We proceed to the standard definition of (nonuniformly) pseudorandom functions from binary strings of size n to binary strings of size (n), where (·) is some fixed polynomial. [14] ). Let (·) be some fixed polynomial and F = {F n } n∈N be a function ensemble, where F n is a set of functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} (n) for every n. The function ensemble F is called pseudorandom if for every family of polynomial-size circuits with oracle access {C n } n∈N , every polynomial p(·), and all sufficiently large n's,
Definition 2.6 (Pseudorandom Functions
where H = {H n } n∈N is the uniform function ensemble over the functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} (n) .
Finally, we define seeded algorithms, which are central to our constructions.
Definition 2.7 (Seeded Algorithms). A seeded algorithm
A is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm taking two inputs x and s n where |x| = n and |s n | = p(n) for some polynomial p(). The distribution induced by a seeded algorithm on an input x is the distribution on outcomes A(x, s n ), where s n is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} p(|x|) .
Informally, a seeded algorithm is private if it is a deterministic private algorithm with high probability over the choices of the seed s n , i.e., A(x, s n ) = A(y, s n ) for all but a negligible fraction of the seeds s n ∈ {0, 1} p(|x|) whenever x ≡ P y.
Equivalence-Protecting Algorithms
In this section we suggest a definition of private algorithm for a search problem and supply efficient algorithms satisfying this definition for a broad class of problems. The privacy guarantee we introduce enjoys some of the advantages of both deterministic and random algorithms. Based on the existence of pseudorandom functions, it provides solutions that look random but do not leak further information while executed repeatedly on inputs that are equivalent. In order to suggest appropriate privacy definitions for secure computation of a search problem, we need to picture how such a computation would take place in an ideal world. The following two definitions capture random sampling of an answer that depends only on the solution set (and not on the specific input).
Definition 3.1 (Private Oracles). Let P = {P n } n∈N be a search problem and q be the polynomial such that P n : {0, 1} n → 2 {0,1} q(n) . We say that for a given n ∈ N, an oracle O n : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} q(n) is private with respect to P n if
O n satisfies the privacy requirement of Definition 2.
3.
An oracle that is private with respect to P represents one possible functionality that solves the search problem and protects the equivalence relation. We define an algorithm to be equivalence-protecting if it cannot be efficiently distinguished from a random oracle that is private with respect to P.
Definition 3.2 (Equivalence-Protecting Algorithms)
. Let P = {P n } n∈N be a search problem. An algorithm A(·, ·) is equivalence protecting with respect to ≡ P if for every family {D n } n∈N of polynomial size distinguisher circuits with oracle access, for every polynomial p, and for all sufficiently large n's,
where the first probability is over the uniform distribution over oracles O n that are private with respect to P; the second probability is over the uniform distribution over the choices of the seed s n for the algorithm A.
In the above definition we arbitrarily choose the uniform distribution over private oracles. This choice is partly because using the uniform distribution is common in many sampling algorithms, see, e.g., [19] . However, for some applications, other distributions might be preferred; Definition 3.2 can be adjusted to such scenarios by requiring an appropriate distribution over the private oracles O n .
Canonical Representatives
The following definition identifies a class of algorithms that will be helpful in constructing equivalence-protecting algorithms for various search problems. These algorithms return a representative element for every equivalence class of the search problem P.
Definition 3.3 (Canonical Representative Algorithms). Let
Algorithm General Equivalence-Protecting INPUT: An instance x ∈ {0, 1} n and a seed s n for a family of pseudorandom functions F = {F n } n∈N . OUTPUT: A solution sol ∈ P n (x). for every x ∈ {0, 1} n ; and (ii) for every x, y ∈ {0, 1} n , it holds that
We reduce the problem of designing an equivalence-protecting algorithm for a search problem into designing a canonical representative algorithm and an output-sampling algorithm for the problem. The construction is based on the existence of pseudorandom functions. Let F = {F n } n∈N be an ensemble of pseudorandom functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} (n) , where (·) is a polynomial that bounds the number of random bits used by the output-sampling algorithm. We denote by f s n (x) the output of the function indexed by s n on an input x ∈ {0, 1} n . Proof. Let A(·, ·) be the algorithm in Fig. 1 . We show that given a family of distinguisher circuits {D n } n∈N such that for infinitely many n,
is noticeable (where O n is a uniformly chosen private oracle with respect to P), we can construct a family of circuits {C n } n∈N that distinguishes executions with oracle access to a pseudorandom function f s n (·) from executions with oracle access to a truly random function H n (·).
The description of C n is simple: C n follows D n . Whenever D n is making an oracle call on an input x, C n simulates it as follows: (i) it computes y = A rep (x); (ii) it computes the answer z of the oracle call on y (i.e., z is either an answer of a random function, namely, H n (y), or an answer of a pseudorandom function, namely, f s n (y)); (iii) it computes A sample (y, z).
Note that C . We next show that the difference
Since C n applies A sample (y, H n (y)), where y ≡ P x and H n is a randomly chosen function, by the properties of the output-sampling algorithm A sample , the output is indistinguishable from a random element in P(x). Hence, the distance
must be noticeable for infinitely many n, in a contradiction to the fact that F is an ensemble of pseudorandom functions.
Equivalence-Protecting Algorithms for Monotone Search Problems
In view of Theorem 3.4, the construction of an equivalence-protecting algorithm for a given search problem is reduced to finding a canonical representative algorithm and an output-sampling algorithm for the problem. We focus on search problems in which an output is a subset of the input satisfying some property (e.g., the input is a graph, and the output is any subgraph satisfying some property). We reduce the design of a canonical representative algorithm into deciding whether an input element is contained in some possible output.
Definition 3.5 (Monotone Search Problems)
. Let P be a search problem and view the inputs to P n as subsets of [n]. We say that P is a monotone search problem if there
. That is, there is a global set S of solutions, and the solutions for X are the solutions in S that are contained in X.
For example, the problem of finding a perfect matching in a bipartite graph is monotone. The global set of solutions S consists of all the graphs whose edges form exactly a perfect matching. For every bipartite graph G, the set of solutions on G is the set of graphs in S (i.e., perfect matching graphs) that are subgraphs of G. Definition 3.6 (Relevant Elements). Let P be a monotone search problem and X ⊆ [n] be an input to P n . We say that i ∈ X is relevant to X if there is an output Y ∈ P n (X) such that i ∈ Y . We denote by R(X) the set of elements relevant to X.
In the perfect matching example, an edge is relevant if it appears in some perfect matching of the graph. The following claim shows that computing R(X) efficiently from X is sufficient to get a canonical representative algorithm. 
and the transitivity of ≡ P .
Applications of the Construction
We next introduce equivalence-protecting algorithms for some well-known search problems.
Example 3.8 (Perfect Matching in Bipartite Graphs
As an output-sampling algorithm, we use the algorithm of Jerrum et al. [19] . The algorithm samples a perfect matching of a bipartite graph from a distribution that is statistically close to uniform. Therefore, we have both a canonical representative and output-sampling algorithm for perfect matching, and thus by Theorem 3.4, we get that perfect matching has an efficient equivalence-protecting algorithm.
It is natural to ask whether the reliance on pseudorandom functions is inherent for this problem. This is indeed true, since the existence of a equivalence-protecting algorithm implies the existence of pseudorandom functions. We next show how to construct an ensemble of pseudorandom functions F = {F n }, where F n = {f s : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m(n) }, from an equivalence-protecting algorithm A(·, s). To apply f s () on x ∈ {0, 1} n , construct a bipartite graph G consisting of two disjoint subgraphs: (i) a bipartite subgraph containing a perfect matching uniquely encoding x (i.e., no two of the constructed graphs share an equivalence class); and (ii) a bipartite subgraph consisting of m(n) copies of the complete bipartite graph K 2,2 (note that in a perfect matching, there are exactly two matching possibilities for each copy of K 2,2 ). Apply A(·, s) to G and output the m(n) bits corresponding to the chosen matchings of the copies of K 2,2 .
Example 3.9 (Linear Algebra). Let n and m be positive integers, F be a finite field, M be an n × m matrix over F, and v ∈ F n . Consider the problem of solving the system My = v. Since this problem is not monotone, we need to design both the canonical representative algorithm and the output-sampling algorithm. As a canonical representative algorithm, simply perform the Gaussian elimination procedure on the system, bringing it to its reduced row echelon form. An elementary linear algebra argument shows that if two systems have the same sets of solutions, then they have the same reduced row echelon form. We now show a simple output-sampling algorithm for the problem: Compute an arbitrary solution y 0 ∈ F m satisfying My 0 = v. Compute k = rank(M) and compute an m × (n − k) matrix K representing the kernel of the matrix M. Randomly pick a vector r ∈ F n−k and output w = y 0 + Kr. Again, elementary linear algebra argument shows that w is a random solution to the system My = v.
Example 3.10 (Shortest Path). Consider the problem of finding a shortest path from a vertex s to a vertex t in a directed graph G. In this case there is no global set of solutions, since a path can be an appropriate solution for one graph, while in another graph there may be shorter paths. However, there exists a canonical representative algorithm for the problem; this algorithm on input G outputs a layered graph G consisting of the set of edges that appear in any shortest path from s to t in G (checking whether an edge is relevant for G can be done, e.g., using breadth-first search). To sample a random solution, do: (i) Starting from t, compute for every v ∈ V of distance i from t the number of shortest paths from v to t, by summing the number of shortest paths from v's neighbors of distance i − 1 to t. (ii) Starting from s, pick the vertices on the path randomly, where the probabilities are weighted according to the number of paths computed in (i). Hence, by Theorem 3.4, a shortest path has an efficient equivalence-protecting algorithm.
Similar ideas are applicable for finding a shortest path in a weighted directed graph with positive weights. Here, however, we do not apply Theorem 3.4 directly. The equivalence-protecting algorithm, given a directed graph G = G, E , a weight function w : E → R + , two vertices s, t, and a seed s n for a family of pseudorandom functions, does the following: (i) Construct a directed graph G = V , E , where E is the set of edges that appear in at least one shortest path from s to t. Note that G is a non-weighted acyclic directed graph; (ii) Compute r = f s n (G ); (iii) Sample, using r, a random path from s to t in the acyclic graph G with uniform distribution and output this path. Note that in step (iii) we sample a random path and not a random shortest path. This example is different in the fact that the canonical input we use in steps (ii) and (iii) is an instance of a problem that is slightly different than the original problem.
Resemblance-Preserving Algorithms
We now strengthen the requirement on private algorithm in an alternative manner to the definition of equivalence-protecting algorithms presented in Sect. 3. The motivation for the definition in this section is that the output of the algorithm should not distinguish between inputs with similar sets of solutions. While this requirement is met by a randomized algorithm that outputs a uniform solution, it cannot in general be satisfied by a deterministic algorithm for search problems-for all inputs x, y ∈ {0, 1} n , the algorithm would have to output the same "solution" on x and y if there exists inputs x = z 0 , z 1 , . . . , z t = y, all in {0, 1} n , such that P n (z i ) ∩ P n (z i+1 ) = ∅; this would, in many cases, contradict the correctness of the search algorithm. As we want an algorithm that does not leak more information on repeated executions, we put forward a definition of resemblance-preserving algorithms, which are seeded algorithms that protect inputs with similar sets of outputs.
To measure the similarity between the sets of outputs, we use resemblance between sets (a.k.a. Jaccard index), a notion used in [6] [7] [8] and seeming to capture the informal notion of "roughly the same." For example, in [6, 7] resemblance between documents was successfully used for clustering documents. 
Note that 0 ≤ r(A, B) ≤ 1, where r(A, B) = 0 iff A and B are disjoint and r(A, B) =
For a search problem P, we will consider the resemblance between solution sets P n (x), P n (y) of x, y ∈ {0, 1} n . Informally, a (perfect) resemblance-preserving algorithm is a seeded algorithm that returns the same output for x and y with probability of at least the resemblance between P n (x) and P n (y). A(·, ·) is resemblance-preserving with respect to P if:
Definition 4.2 (Resemblance-Preserving Algorithms). An algorithm

For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D and every polynomial p(·),
there exists some n 0 ∈ N such that for every x ∈ {0, 1} * satisfying |x| > n 0 ,
The probability is taken over the random choice of the seed s n and the randomness of D. Informally, taking the probability over the seed, the output of A P on x is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution on P n (x). 2. There exists a constant c > 0 such that for all x, y ∈ {0, 1} * satisfying |x| = |y|,
The probability is taken over the random choice of s n . That is, the probability that A returns the same output on two inputs is at least some constant times the resemblance between P n (x) and P n (y). 3. If x ≡ P y, then A(s n , x) = A(s n , y) for all seeds s n . That is, if x and y are equivalent, then A always returns the same output on x and on y.
If c = 1 in the above Requirement 2, then A(·, ·) is perfect resemblance-preserving with respect to P.
We note that our choice in Requirement 2 above that the probability should be at least linear in the resemblance is somewhat arbitrary. A definition of a similar flavor results by requiring the probability to be lower bounded by some monotone function of the resemblance. Requirement 3 can be relaxed to all but a negligible fraction of the seeds.
Resemblance-Preserving vs. Equivalence-Protecting
We note that the requirements in Definitions 3.2 and 4.2 are incomparable (we show in Sect. 5.3 that there exist search problems that admit resemblance-preserving but no equivalence-protecting algorithms, and vise versa). In particular, we note that unlike Definition 3.2, in the definition of resemblance-preserving algorithms we do not know how to formulate privacy using the real world vs. ideal world paradigm. One of the consequences of this difference is that it is possible to design resemblance-preserving algorithms without needing cryptographic assumptions. In our constructions, for example, we only use pairwise independent permutations. Furthermore, Definition 4.2 does not prevent partial disclosure or even full disclosure of the seed by the algorithm. This should be considered when using a resemblance-preserving algorithm.
Example 4.3 (Non-Roots of a Polynomial).
We give an example demonstrating that perfect resemblance-preserving algorithms exist. Consider the following problem. The inputs are univariate polynomials of degree d(n) over F 2 n , where d : N → N is some fixed increasing function (e.g., d(n) = n). The set of solutions of a polynomial Q is the set of all points y which are not roots of Q, that is, {y ∈ F 2 n : Q(y) = 0}. This problem arises, e.g., when we want to find points on which two polynomials disagree.
The seed s n in the algorithm we construct is a random string of length (d(n) + 1) · n considered as a list of d(n) + 1 elements in F 2 n . Since Q has at most d(n) roots, there is an element in the list s n that is not a root of Q. The algorithm on input Q returns the first element in s n that is not a root of Q. We claim that this algorithm is resemblancepreserving. First, since the seed is chosen at random, the first element in the list that is not a root is a random non-root of Q. Second, consider two polynomials Q 1 and Q 2 with sets of non-roots Y 1 and Y 2 , respectively. The algorithm returns the same non-root on both Q 1 and Q 2 if the first element in the list s n from Y 1 is also the first element in the list s n from Y 2 . In other words, the algorithm returns the same non-root if the first element in the list s n which is from the set
Generic Constructions of Resemblance-Preserving Algorithms
We present our main tool for constructing resemblance-preserving algorithms-minwise independent permutations. We will first show a general construction, which (depending on the search problem) may exhibit exponential time complexity. Then, we will present the main contribution of this section-a polynomial-time resemblancepreserving algorithm that is applicable for problems for which there is a pairwise independent family of permutations where we can efficiently compute the minimum on any set of solutions. [8] ). Let U be a set and F = {π s } s∈S be a collection of permutations π s : U → U . The collection F is a collection of min-wise independent permutations if Pr[min(π s (A)) = π s (a)] = 1/|A| for all A ⊆ U and all a ∈ A. The probability is taken over the choice of the seed s at uniform from S.
Definition 4.4 (Family of Min-wise Independent Permutations
We will use the following observation that relates min-wise permutations and resemblance: Observation 4.5 [8] . Let F be a family of min-wise independent permutations {π s } s∈S , where π s : U → U . Then Pr[min(π s (A)) = min(π s (B))] = r(A, B) for every sets A, B ⊆ U . The probability is taken over the choice of the seed s at uniform from S.
In Fig. 2 , we describe Algorithm Minwise P for a search problem P, where P n : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} q(n) . Using Observation 4.5, it is easy to see that Algorithm Minwise P is perfectly resemblance-preserving.
However, Algorithm Minwise P may be inefficient in several aspects:
An instance x ∈ {0, 1} * and a seed s for a family of min-wise independent permutations {π s } s∈S , where π s : {0, 1} q(|x|) → {0, 1} q(|x|) . OUTPUT: A solution sol ∈ P n (x). 1. Algorithm Minwise P uses a family of min-wise independent permutations. It was shown in [8] that such families are of size 2 (|U |) = 2 (2 q(n) ) (where n is the input length), and hence the seed length |s| = (2 q(n) ). However, for most purposes, the seed length may be reduced to polynomial by using pseudorandom permutations. 6 2. Algorithm Minwise P needs to compute the minimum element, according to π s , in the solution set P n (x). This is feasible when it is possible to enumerate in polynomial time the elements of P n (x). However, to make Minwise P feasible in cases where, for example, P n (x) is of super-polynomial size, one needs to carefully use the structure of π s and the structure of the underlying solution set space.
Example 4.6 (Roots of a Polynomial).
As an example that Algorithm Minwise P can be implemented efficiently, we consider the problem of finding roots of a polynomial. As in Example 4.3, the inputs are univariate polynomials of degree d(n) over F 2 n , where d : N → N is some fixed increasing function (e.g., d(n) = n). The set of solutions of a polynomial Q is the set of all points y which are roots of Q, that is, {y ∈ F 2 n : Q(y) = 0}. Berlekamp [4] presented an efficient algorithm that finds roots of a polynomial over F 2 n . We implement Algorithm Minwise P , where we use a family of pseudorandom permutations from F 2 n to F 2 n instead of the family of min-wise independent permutations. 7 Furthermore, since the number of roots of a polynomial of degree d(n) is at most d(n), we can use Berlekamp's algorithm to explicitly find all roots of the polynomial, apply the pseudorandom permutation to each root, and find for which root π s (y) obtains a minimum. The above algorithm can be generalized to any search problems whose entire sets of solutions can be generated efficiently.
Observation 4.7.
If for a search problem P, there is an algorithm that generates the set of solutions of an input of P whose running time is polynomial in the length of the input (and, in particular, the number of solutions in polynomial), then Algorithm Minwise P can be efficiently implemented for P. 6 We need the family of pseudorandom permutations to be secure against a nonuniform adversary. Thus, for every long enough inputs x and y, a pseudorandom permutation must be min-wise. We omit further details as instead of using pseudorandom permutations we replace, in Sect. 4.2, min-wise independent permutations with pairwise independent permutations. 7 If we do not want to use cryptographic assumptions, we can construct a nonperfect resemblancepreserving algorithm as in Sect. 4.2.
Resemblance-Preserving Using Pairwise Independence
To get around the above mentioned problems of implementing Minwise P for search problems with a super-polynomial number of solutions, we construct a nonperfect resemblance-preserving algorithm using pairwise independence permutations instead of min-wise independence. Theorem 4.9 [8] . Let F = {π s } s∈S be a family of pairwise independent permutations, where π s : U → U . Then for every set A ⊆ U and every a ∈ A,
The probability is taken over the uniform choice of the seed s from S.
For completeness, we give the proof of Theorem 4.9 in Appendix A. We get the following lemma: 
Proof. To see the first bound, note that
The second bound follows from the right inequality of Theorem 4.9: In Fig. 3 , we construct an algorithm Pairwise P that is almost identical to Minwise P of Fig. 2 , where the family of min-wise permutations is replaced with a family of pairwise independent permutations. The following corollary follows directly from Lemma 4.10: Fig. 3 is resemblance-preserving. 
Applications of the Pairwise Independence Construction
We next show how to apply Algorithm Pairwise P to a few search problems. Given a search problem, we need to choose the family of pairwise independent permutations such that the solution minimizing π s (A) can be computed efficiently. In our examples we use the following well-known family of pairwise independent permutations from F n q to F n q for some prime-power q:
H is an invertible n × n matrix over F q and b ∈ F n q .
Claim 4.12.
The family L q,n is a family of pairwise independent permutations.
Linear Algebra
We show how to construct a resemblance-preserving algorithm for finding a solution of a system of equations (as considered in Example 3.9 for Equivalence-Protecting Algorithms).
Linear Algebra over F 2 We assume that the system is over F 2 . In the next paragraph we generalize the result to every finite field. That is, the input is an m × n matrix M over F 2 and a vector v ∈ F m 2 , and a solution is a vector y ∈ F n 2 such that
We apply Algorithm Pairwise P for this problem using the family L 2,n . That is, we choose a permutation at random, specified by H and b, and we need to find the lexicographically first z satisfying
for y satisfying My = v. We view My = v and z = Hy + b as a single system of linear equations with 2n unknowns, namely, y = y 1 , . . . , y n and z = z 1 , . . . , z n . To find the value of z 1 in the lexicographically first z, we add the equation z 1 = 0 to the system of equations. If the new system has a solution, we keep the equation z 1 = 0 in the system and continue to find the value of z 2 . Otherwise, we understand that z 1 = 1 in every solution of the original system of equations, and, in particular, in the lexicographically first z. In this case, we remove the equation z 1 = 0 from the system of equations and continue to find the value of z 2 . To conclude, we find the lexicographically first z iteratively, where in iteration i we have already found the values of z 1 , . . . , z i−1 , and we compute the value of z i in the lexicographically first z as we found z 1 . We continue these iterations until we find the lexicographically first z. Recall that Hy + b is a permutation. Thus, once we found z, the solution y is uniquely defined and is easy to compute from the system of equations, that is, compute y = H −1 (z − b).
Linear Algebra over Finite Fields
We show that the construction described for linear algebra over F 2 works for an arbitrary finite field F q when we use L q,n as the pairwise independent permutations. In the case of F 2 , when we ruled out the case z i = 0, we immediately deduced that z i = 1. In a first glance, it seems that generalizing the above construction to F q would require checking if x i = a for every value of a ∈ F q . However, the next claim shows that this is not required. 
Proof. Let
First, since v i = w i , the vector u is properly defined. Second,
Third, u is a solution to the system of equations
Recall that the algorithm for finding the lexicographically first z iteratively adds the equation z i = 0 if, after adding the equation, the system has a solution and does not add anything otherwise. By Claim 4.13, when the algorithm does not add the equation z i = 0, there is a unique value for z i in all the solutions. Thus, after the n iterations, the system has a unique solution y, z, and the algorithm computes y and returns it.
Union of Linear Spaces
We want to use the resemblance-preserving algorithm for finding a solution of a system of linear equations to construct resemblance-preserving algorithms for other problems. That is, we want to represent the set of solutions of an instance of some search problem as a set of solutions of a system of linear equations. In our applications, we manage to represent the set of solutions of an instance as a union of polynomially many linear spaces represented by systems of linear equations over the same field. We next show how to construct a resemblance-preserving algorithm for such a union. That is, the input is a sequence M 1 , v 1 
Points in a Union of Discrete Rectangles
We show how to use the resemblance-preserving algorithm for linear algebra to construct resemblance-preserving algorithms for finding a point in a union of discrete rectangles. We construct such algorithms for two cases: (1) unions of rectangles in [2] n , that is, DNF formulae, and (2) 
Satisfying Assignment for a DNF Formula
We show how to construct a resemblancepreserving algorithm for finding a satisfying assignment of a DNF formula. This follows from Theorem 4.14 and the following observations. First, the set of satisfying assignments of a single term is the set of solutions of a system of linear equations over F 2 :
• For every variable x i that appears in the term without negation, add the equation y i = 1. • For every variable x i that appears in the term with negation, add the equation y i = 0. Now, given a DNF formula with terms, a satisfying assignment to the formula is an assignment satisfying at least one of the terms in the formula, that is, it belongs to the union of solutions of the systems of linear equations constructed for each of the terms of the formula. Thus, by Theorem 4.14, we get a resemblance-preserving algorithm for finding a satisfying assignment of a DNF formula.
Points in a Union of Discrete Rectangles in a d-dimensional Space
We show how to construct a resemblance-preserving algorithm for finding a point in a discrete rectangle. That is, for some fixed d ∈ N and for an integer N ∈ N, our inputs are 2d elements
which represent a rectangle as follows: Let n def = log N ; we represent a number a ∈ [N ] by an n-bit string a 1 , . . . , a n , where a = n i=1 a i 2 n−i . Note that, in this section, a i is a string in {0, 1} n , and a i is the ith bit of a string a.
We solve the problem of finding a point in a rectangle by describing a decision tree 8 that accepts exactly the points in the rectangle. Since each decision tree with nodes can be represented by a DNF formula with at most terms, we can use the resemblancepreserving algorithm for DNF (described in the previous paragraph) to output a satisfying assignment to the formula, i.e., a point in the rectangle. The decision tree for this case is very simple; it is basically composed of two paths of internal nodes, and it has at most 2n leaves. We will not describe the tree but rather give an example in Fig. 4, where a = (1, 0, 0, 1) and b = (1, 1, 1, 0) . In this example, if y 1 = 0, then y < a, thus, the root of the decision tree is labeled by the variable y 1 , its left son is a leaf labeled by 0, and its right subtree is a decision tree checking if (0, 0, 1) ≤ (y 2 , y 3 , y 4 ) ≤ (1, 1, 0) . Furthermore, a 2 = b 2 , so in this subtree the root is labeled by y 2 , its left subtree checks if (0, 1) ≤ (y 3 , y 4 ), and its right subtree checks if (y 3 , y 4 ) ≤ (1, 0). The DNF formula for this tree has a term for each leaf labeled by 1; the formula is (y 1 ∧ ¬y 2 ∧ ¬y 3 ∧ y 4 ) ∨ (y 1 ∧ ¬y 2 ∧ y 3 ) ∨ (y 1 ∧ y 2 ∧ ¬y 3 ) ∨ (y 1 ∧ ¬y 2 ∧ y 3 ∧ ¬y 4 ). 8 A decision tree is an ordered binary tree such that each leaf is labeled by 0 or 1 and each internal node is labeled by a variable. To check if the decision tree accepts an assignment, we start at the root of the tree and traverse until we reach a leaf according to the following rule: If the assignment satisfies the variable in the internal node, we go to its right son, otherwise we go to its left son. The assignment is accepted if we reach a leaf labeled by 1 and is rejected otherwise.
To construct a decision tree checking membership in a d-dimensional rectangle specified by a 1 , . . . , a d , b 1 ((log N) d , ) .
The above algorithm is polynomial in and (log N) d , while the size of the input is O ( d log N) , thus, it is polynomial when d is constant. It would be interesting to construct an efficient algorithm for nonconstant d. Notice that a union of rectangles in [2] d is equivalent to an -term DNF formula with d variables. Thus, there is a polynomial resemblance-preserving algorithm for union of rectangles in [2] d . Figure 5 summarizes the main classes of private algorithms discussed in this paper and their containment relationships. We now show that different search problems admit different types of private algorithms. Proof sketch. We use the fact that it is possible to decide in polynomial time whether a DNF formula φ is satisfiable. Given a satisfiable DNF formula φ over variables x 1 , . . . , x n , our algorithm constructs the formula φ = φ| x 1 =0 . If φ is satisfiable, let a 1 = 0, and otherwise let a 1 = 1. Continue by finding the lexicographically first assignment for the formula φ| x 1 =a 1 .
Relationships Between the Classes of Private Algorithms
Claim 5.2. Unless RP = NP, there is no polynomial time deterministic algorithm for outputting the median assignment of DNF formulae. Proof sketch. We use the fact that (the decision problem) UNIQUE-SAT is NP-hard under randomized reductions [20] and show that it is possible to reduce UNIQUE-SAT to finding the median assignment of DNF formulae. Let φ be an instance of UNIQUE-SAT (i.e., φ is a CNF formula (over the variables x 1 , . . . , x n ) that is either unsatisfiable or has a unique satisfying assignment). Construct a DNF formula ψ by exchanging conjuncts with disjuncts and negating all literals. It is easy to see that an assignment a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) satisfies φ iff it does not satisfy ψ . Hence, if φ is unsatisfiable, then ψ is a tautology, and its median assignment is (1, 0, . . . , 0) ; otherwise there exists a unique assignment that does not satisfy ψ.
We now show how to check whether ψ is a tautology. We first compute the median satisfying assignment of ψ and note that if it is not (1, 0, . . . , 0) , then ψ is not a tautology. It is, however, possible that the unique assignment that does not satisfy ψ is above (1, 0, . . . , 0) in lexicographic order. We hence continue recursively with the formula ψ| x 1 =1 .
Deterministic Private vs. Output-Sampling Algorithms
We now demonstrate a search problem that admits an output-sampling algorithm (recall that an output-sampling algorithm outputs a uniformly chosen solution on each instance) but no efficient deterministic private, equivalence-protecting, or resemblancepreserving algorithm. Proof. Construct an algorithm A QR that on input (N, a) selects a random r ∈ Z * N and outputs b = r 2 · a mod N . It is easy to see that b is chosen uniformly from QR(N, a) . Hence, algorithm A QR is an output-sampling algorithm.
To see the infeasibility result for the class of deterministic private algorithms, assume the existence of such an algorithm A QR for QR and construct a (deterministic) algorithm B for deciding quadratic residuosity as follows. 9 On input (N, a) algorithm B applies A QR on (N, 1) and on (N, a) . It answers "QR" if A QR outputs the same element of Z * N on both invocations and "NQR" otherwise. Note that QR(N, a) = QR N if and only if a ∈ QR N . Since A QR is a deterministic private algorithm (with answers depending only on the solution set), for every N , it returns the same quadratic residue for all a ∈ QR N . The correctness follows since 1 ∈ QR N and hence QR(N, 1) = QR N .
The argument for showing infeasibility of equivalence-protecting and resemblancepreserving algorithms is similar. We modify algorithm B to be a randomized algorithm 9 The Quadratic Residuosity problem is to decide, given a modulus N and a number a ∈ Z * N , whether a ∈ QR N = {r 2 : r ∈ Z * N }. It is believed that deciding quadratic residuosity when N = p · q for large primes p, q is intractable. that first chooses a random seed s (of the appropriate length) for A QR and then acts like the deterministic algorithm described above.
The next example is of a search problem that admits a deterministic private algorithm but no (nontrivial) output-sampling algorithm.
Definition 5.5. For a CNF formula φ over Boolean variables x 1 , . . . , x n , define
We say that a randomized algorithm A for ZERO-SAT is nontrivial if A(φ) returns, with a non-negligible probability, a nonzero assignment whenever φ is satisfiable by some nonzero assignment. Proof. Consider the algorithm that on input a CNF formula φ over Boolean variables x 1 , . . . , x n outputs 0 n . This is a private deterministic algorithm for ZERO-SAT . To get the infeasibility result, assume A ZERO−SAT is a non-trivial output-sampling algorithm for the search problem ZERO-SAT , and let p(n) be a polynomial such that, on satisfiable formulae over x 1 , . . . , x n ,
Construct a randomized algorithm B for deciding SAT. On input a CNF formula φ, algorithm B first checks if φ(0 n ) is satisfied. Otherwise, it applies A ZERO−SAT for a total of n · p(n) times. If in any of the invocations A ZERO−SAT returns a nonzero assignment satisfying φ, then B outputs "YES," otherwise it outputs "NO." It is easy to see that algorithm B runs in polynomial time, accepts all satisfiable formulae with probability 1 − e −n , and rejects all non-satisfiable formulae. If RP = NP , then no such efficient algorithm B exists, and, thus, no efficient nontrivial randomized private algorithm for ZERO-SAT exists.
Resemblance-Preserving vs. Equivalence-Protecting Algorithms
In Sect. 4.3 we saw that a resemblance-preserving algorithm exists for the search problem of finding satisfying assignments for DNF formulae. However, no efficient equivalence-protecting algorithm for DNF exists, unless NP⊆BPP (and hence using self reduction of NP-complete problems, RP = NP) since such an algorithm can be used to check if two DNF formulae are equivalent, a problem that is coNP-complete (since it is possible to reduce DNF-TAUTOLOGY to DNF equivalence by setting one of the formulae to a tautology). This problem does exhibit efficient deterministic private algorithms as described in Sect. 5.1.
Our last example is of a search problem that has an equivalence-protecting algorithm but no resemblance-preserving algorithm. This example is a variation on the quadratic residuosity problem discussed above, where we ensure that there are no equivalent inputs, however, there are inputs with nearly identical sets of solutions. (N, a) , let n = log n , that is, n is the number of bits in the representation of N . We construct an equivalence-protecting algorithm A QR * that uses the seed s n as a seed for a family {F n } n∈N of pseudorandom functions. On input (N, a) , the algorithm A QR * uses f s n (N, a) to sample r ∈ Z * N and j ∈ {1, . . . , N} and returns (j, ar 2 
Proof. Given an input
mod N).
The argument for showing infeasibility of resemblance-preserving algorithms for QR * is similar to the infeasibility of such an algorithm for QR. The only difference is that for every a ∈ QR N , the sets QR * (N, 1) and QR * (N, a) have symmetric difference two, thus their resemblance is large, and thus a resemblance-preserving algorithm must return the same answer on them with high probability.
Discussion
Understanding how the choice of a solution for a search problem affects the extent that information is leaked is essential in coming up with protocols that preserve meaningful privacy. At present, no theory exists for analyzing this leakage and for matching such choices with the privacy needs of applications.
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 4.9
We first prove that (k − 1)( 1 − (k − 1)(n 0 − 1)
